assessments of Beauvoir's chapter and they deem Beauvoir's philosophical account as inadequate and fallacious. Their readings, however, are instructive in so far as reading Card and Ferguson by means of critique opens up valuable insight on Beauvoir's understanding of lesbian existence and also sheds light on its importance. Furthermore, such a critique will underscore the positions taken by Margaret Simons and Meryl Altman, which both emphasize a complex and nuanced understanding of Beauvoir's notion of lesbianism (Altman 2007; Simons 1992) . As Altman affirms, "Many U.S. lesbian feminists have found Beauvoir's lesbian chapter problematic", leading to an abrogation of Beauvoir's understanding of lesbianism (Altman 2007, 209) . "But", Altman continues, it "may be a good time to look again" (ebd.) and this is precisely where I aim to pick up Card and Ferguson's reading. In Ferguson's "Lesbian Identity: Beauvoir and History" Ferguson looks to secure a notion of lesbian identity that is both historicized and socio-political, and her critique suggests that Beauvoir's account of lesbian existence is ahistorical. Ferguson sees the failure to offer a historical definition of lesbianism as one that undercuts the ability to address the various manifestations of both lesbian identity and heterosexist ideology over time. From this perspective, Beauvoir neglects how lesbianism came to be a choice in Western industrial societies. Thus, and following her related work in the 1980s, Ferguson wants a more complex and contingent account of lesbian existence than Beauvoir can give. 3 Similarly, in "Lesbian Attitudes and The Second Sex" Card also finds shortcomings in Beauvoir's account of lesbianism. Card worries over Beauvoir's use of the notions of choice and lesbian attitudes as being uncritical and suggests that rather than offer a nuanced account of lesbians' lives, the use of these terms in "The Lesbian" give, at best, an account of lesbian lives as human lives. But more so, the lack of discussion of heterosexuality as a choice or attitude masks the ways in which heterosexuality is, in reality, normative and ideological. From Beauvoir, then, at least according to Card, what we find is both an account of existence that is not lesbian in any particular way and an uncritical valuation of sexual normativity. So, like Ferguson, Card demands a socio-political notion of lesbian existence that emphasizes contingencies and the constraints that frame lesbian lives in a given time and place. And thus, the critical point by both Card and Ferguson is that Beauvoir's account of lesbian existence lacks contingency, fails to consider historical and political formations of lesbianism, and also neglects to challenge heteronormative ideological constructions of sexuality.
But, from my reading, Card and Ferguson misconstrue Beauvoir's project in "The Lesbian" on several accounts. They both fail to situate Beauvoir's notions of choice and attitude in their proper philosophical contexts, which leads to misinterpretations and thus incorrect conclusions. In each of their articles, these terms serve only as analytical categories: choice is an ethical term that relates to pure acts of freedom, while attitude is simply a stance, pose, or identity one chooses.
Yet, as Eva Goethlin and Sara Heinamaa show, Beauvoir's work and philosophical contributions are easily misconstrued when read outside of the existential-phenomenological tradition (Goethlin 2006; Goethlin 2003; Heinamaa 2003) . Thus, it is necessary to return to "The Lesbian" to reinterpret these central notions of choice and attitude in order to further understand Beauvoir's philosophical insights on lesbian experience and existence. My aim is, like that of Simons and Altman, to do justice to Beauvoir's "The Lesbian" by situating it within an existential phenomenological context, and the importance of doing so is underscored by the interpretations given by Card and Ferguson. Ultimately, by returning to Beauvoir after a departure from Card and Ferguson, I show that Beauvoir offers an existential phenomenological understanding of lesbian experience, appropriating Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived body to emphasize the disclosure of lesbian existence through experience. This understanding, I claim, is both novel and liberatory. While on the one hand, we can see this as a counter-narrative to the psychoanalytic theory of Beauvoir's time that deemed lesbians as pathological, Beauvoir's phenomenological understanding provides a robust account of the ambiguities and freedoms of and within lesbian life.
Choosing Lesbianism
Card and Ferguson both assert that Beauvoir's account succeeds on the grounds that it claims "lesbianism is a mode of resistance to male domination" (Ferguson 1990, 280) and asserts "that ‚homosexuality' is neither a deliberate perversion nor a physiologically, psychologically, or economically determined fate…" (Card 1990, 290) . In this sense, Card and Ferguson credit Beauvoir for a perspective on lesbianism that is not deeply committed to the psychoanalytic discourse that was regarded as the authority on lesbian experience in her time. And yet, at the very same time, they understand this to be Beauvoir's failure. When Beauvoir asserts, "in truth, homosexuality is no more a deliberate perversion than a fatal curse. It is an attitude that is chosen in situation; it is both motivated and freely adopted" Beauvoir's understanding of lesbian experience culminates in her view that lesbianism is a motivated choice; a conscious act by the lesbian herself. Card and Ferguson reject this understanding of lesbian experience.
It is not, however, that they reject Beauvoir's claim that women choose to be lesbians. Rather, they reject the account Beauvoir gives of this choice. For Card, this notion of choice Beauvoir purports is simplistic and uncritical: while Beauvoir "makes good sense of the radicalesbian position that one can take responsibility for one's sexual orientation" she "does not treat heterosexuality as a choice at all" (Card 1990, 291, 294) . From Card's reading, Beauvoir suggests that lesbians take full responsibility for their sexuality and as such, are free in their condition, presupposing that lesbians are women who have knowingly, and without con-straint, chosen to be lesbians. And, Card suggests, Beauvoir's "focus is on women whose heterosexual orientation is utterly taken for granted" such that lesbianism amounts to an ethical choice to escape heterosexual normativity and domination (ebd., 292). But this view, Card asserts, is wrong. There is the possibility that lesbians may not have chosen their lesbianism at all and that, in fact, lesbian experience can be a complicated choice or even a forced one. 4 Because of this, choosing lesbianism is not a voluntary flight from patriarchy and the notion of choice is not constitutive of lesbians as such.
Ferguson, though, takes her critique a step further to suggest that this notion of choice whereby lesbians, in contrast to heterosexual women, take full responsibility for their experience amounts to "an individualist and ahistorical approach" to lesbian sexuality (Ferguson 1990, 285) . From the notion of choice, Ferguson claims Beauvoir does not consider how the material conditions and social context frame one's sexual options and form one's sexual identity. For Ferguson, like Card, Beauvoir's failure lies in her omission of choice as historically produced is problematic. As Ferguson states, "lesbian identity as we understand it today has only become an existent social option in the twentieth century in Western industrial societies" and Beauvoir has nothing to say about this (ebd.). Consequently, there is no argument made for a "distinction between lesbian practices and lesbian identity" in Beauvoir's work (ebd., 287). We are left with choice as an individual enterprise that offers no framework for understanding why and how lesbianism is chosen in a given time.
Lesbian Attitudes?
Despite these problems, Card points out that even if one is to follow Beauvoir's notion of choice unproblematically, another problem arises: the notion of lesbian attitudes. In "The Lesbian" Beauvoir describes how, in psychoanalytic theory, "lesbians mostly fall into two categories: ‚masculine lesbians' who ‚try to act like men' and ‚feminine' ones, who are ‚afraid of men'" (Beauvoir 2010, 420) . She later continues to call these categories "two attitudes" of lesbian experience and she affirms, as "a fact … one can … observe" these "two tendencies in homosexual women" (ebd.). Card suggests that this notion of attitudes is "the object of choice" but Card questions whether lesbianism is a thing that can be an object of choice in the first place (Card 1990, 295) . Given this critical disposition toward the notion of attitudes, Card asks, "What is an attitude?...Can an attitude be chosen?" (ebd.). Card then goes on to claim, "An attitude is a pose a position, a stance, a disposition. Originally a technical term from the Arts of Design … it has come 4 She says specifically, "It is, however, also possible for lesbians not to have chosen the lesbian orientations that they have developed as a result of their more specific choices. Being committed to a lesbian orientation goes beyond simply having one" (Card 1990, 294) .
to be a psychological term referring to a complex behavior and valuation" which carries with it a level of individual responsibility such that "we expect people to take responsibility for their attitudes" (ebd., 295 f.). Here, Card strengthens her critique of choice. But, the significance of this claim for Card is not just that this makes lesbians responsible for being lesbians, but also that Beauvoir's focus on lesbian attitudes is limited and negatively so. For Card, Beauvoir understands lesbian attitudes as characterized primarily by a "negative attitude toward men" (ebd., 296) a chosen rejection of the heterosexual attitude, rather than a positive notion that lesbians love, live with, and have sex with other women. According to Card, there is no lesbian attitude per se for Beauvoir; a lesbian attitude is an attitude defined by heterosexual logic. This makes Beauvoir's view on lesbians analogous to her view on women as a whole such that there are, in fact, no lesbian attitudes. 5 Beauvoir, therefore, has nothing exceptional to say about lesbians.
Unlike Card, Ferguson does see that Beauvoir has something particular to say about lesbians and lesbian attitudes, except for Ferguson, this amounts to a naturalized, universal idealist understanding of lesbian choice. For Ferguson, Beauvoir's claim that "Women's homosexuality is one attempt among others to reconcile her autonomy with the passivity of her flesh. And if nature is to be invoked, one can say that all women are naturally homosexual" is contentious due to its naturalistic tone (Ferguson 1990, 280f.) . 6 If Beauvoir is to claim that lesbianism is somehow more natural for women, then Ferguson claims she again fails to recognize the social and material conditions out of which lesbian experience arises, but also that such neglect suggests that lesbian experience is "a universal meaning" from an "idealist approach" (ebd., 281, 287). This results in the affirmation that lesbian attitudes are a natural choice. "On the contrary" Ferguson states, "I would argue that lesbianism as a political choice … can only be validated in a concrete historical context…" (ebd.).
Rethinking "Choice" and "Lesbian Attitudes" Card and Ferguson, however, neglect to contextualize choice and attitude as particular philosophical concepts. For Beauvoir, both concepts are more complex than Ferguson and Card suggest. 7 Beauvoir sees choice as a deeply metaphysical commitment that is both emergent in and constrained by one's historical, mate-5 Card even says explicitly, "These comments assess lesbian relationships simply as human relationships, not as specifically lesbian" (Card 1990, 297). 6 Here Ferguson uses the Parshley translation from 1974. The 2010 translation, however, is slightly different: "Homosexuality for woman is one attempt among others to reconcile her autonomy with the passivity of her flesh. And if nature is invoked, it could be said that every woman is naturally homosexual" (Beauvoir 2010, 419) . 7 Simons also makes a similar case in response to Card's reading of the "choice" of lesbianism. Simons asserts, following Butler, that Cards reading fails to situate choice at the rupture of rial situation. Her notion of choice is not a liberal freedom, but an ambiguous human condition that is always dependent on a historical situation. The ambiguity at work here is key for understanding Beauvoir's project. As Goethlin says, for Beauvoir, "In the authentic sexual relation, the ambiguity of the human reality is concretely lived, being both…separate and interdependent" (Goethlin 2006, 142) . For Beauvoir, it is not that one can just choose one's lesbianism, but rather that lesbians, as existential beings, are characterized by the ability to choose. This explicitly underlies Beauvoir's thought in "The Lesbian" and it is particularly important when it comes to reconsidering the pathological rationale for lesbianism offered by psychoanalysis. To understand lesbians as characterized by choice means "it is difficult to determine" precisely why a woman chooses lesbianism or acts masculine; she can choose to do so for a number of reasons (Beauvoir 2010, 431) . And secondly, to recognize that lesbians have choice is to affirm, as Beauvoir does, that "it is wrong to establish a radical distinction between heterosexual and homosexual" (ebd.). A lack of radical distinction does not, however, mean there is no difference between heterosexual women and lesbians, but in undermining the radical distinction, Beauvoir asserts that because choice is characteristic of both groups of women, lesbians exist as human beings, not as pathological inverts.
Furthermore, affirming this lack of radical distinction affirms the existential burden of choice. For Beauvoir, since a lesbian has choice, she has a place to become, a space from which she can transform her situation. This affirmation of lesbian choice, then, contrary to Card's view, is both a counter narrative to psychoanalysis and an articulation of lesbian life as transcendence. Lesbians, as existents, are with choice, and are, in fact, for Beauvoir, characterized as having different choices than heterosexual women given the difference in their situations.
Yet, this choice stands in stark contrast to the individualist, liberal choice that Ferguson claims it to be. For Beauvoir, choice does not come from nowhere; it is not had by an internal self, but is constrained and encouraged by, indeed taken up in, one's situation. Beauvoir attends to this when she speaks of specific lesbian experience as a choice several times in the chapter. An individual "woman may discover or sense through complete or tentative experiences that she will not derive pleasure from heterosexual relations, that only another woman is able so satisfy her…" while the relations "among the women students of Sèvres who lived together far from men" was constitutive of their choosing lesbianism (ebd.; Hervorhebung M. B.). From these examples, we see Beauvoir's description of the lesbian in terms of choice means the choice to be lesbian is a situated, historical act. As Beauvoir asserts "It is very important to emphasize this: the refusal to make oneself an object is not always what leads a woman to homosexuality… Circumstances…also have an important part in this choice (Beauvoir 2010, 428 ff) . Thus, heteronormative gender identity. My point, while aligned with Simons and Butler, is slightly different. I aim to emphasize that choice is a constrained act of freedom.
the choice of lesbianism is a result of "…certain circumstances that give these relations particular characteristics" (ebd., 432). As Simons affirms, "Freedom and choice are limited…" (Simons 1992, 159) .
The situatedness of this choice also means that attitude is not ahistorical or natural. Lesbian attitudes are formed within and by social meanings and structures. For instance, when describing the masculine character of some lesbians, Beauvoir asserts, "What gives women enclosed in homosexuality a masculine character is not their erotic life…it is all the responsibilities they have to assume because they do without men" (Beauvoir 2010, 433) . It is thus not that lesbians can be essentially masculine, but that given the society they live in, which defines masculine behavior as a lack of dependency on a man, lesbians are characterized as masculine. 8 For Beauvoir, then, a particular, patriarchal situation is what marks lesbian attitudes as masculine.
And, the notion of attitude also provides a way to acknowledge the lived disclosure of lesbian sexuality. Following Heinamaa, it is necessary to read Beauvoir's use of attitude in relation to Merleau-Ponty: "In Merleau-Ponty's analysis, the living body expresses a ‚manner' … of relating to the world, or an ‚attitude' toward the world" (Heinamaa 2003, 38) . The living body characterized via lesbian attitudes is to mark lesbian experience as a fundamental engagement with one's embodied being in the world, and as such, is to mark a continuous process of becoming such that lesbianism is lived and engaged, rather than had as a pathology. In this sense, attitude is a phenomenological term understood as a stylization that is a specific mode of relating oneself to one's situation. Lesbian attitudes are not merely poses, behaviors or an identity category, but are, rather, particular forms of embodiment. An attitude, as Heinamaa notes, is "not a thing, it is not a property or a relation, but a manner of connecting things and other realities…" (ebd., 41). A lesbian attitude, then, is an attitude toward existence; it is a particular, concrete "manner of dealing with situations" (ebd.; Hervorhebung M. B.).
So, when Beauvoir describes the comportments, styles, and tastes of lesbian women she is not generalizing about what lesbian women do and who they are, or romanticizing their experiences. Rather, she is describing how lesbians relate to the world, how lesbians act within their situations. For instance, she says: 8 Altman makes an important point about Beauvoir's use of psychoanalytic discourse to describe lesbian characteristics. For Altman, "I'd argue we need to remember to read her use of the psychoanalysts and the other sexologists in volume 2 through the comments about method in volume 1: she's making use of their descriptive accounts, particularly on subjects where other data are scant, without privileging scientific claims over other sorts of truth claims (made for example by memoir or imaginative literature) and without accepting the underlying determinisms that the pseudoscientific accounts imply." (Altman, 215) . Thus, lesbians may be masculine in a patriarchal society that utilizes the discourse of (patriarchal) psychoanalysis. Certainly, today, we can see numerous other discourses on lesbians that allow us to conceive of, know, and interpret the lives of lesbians. Beauvoir gives numerous examples of lesbian lives such as this in order to show that lesbian attitudes disclosure of sexuality and subjectivity. The lesbian athlete and lesbian artist stylize their lived bodies in particular ways to enact their situations, which ultimately contributes to the sedimentation of lesbian attitudes. Beauvoir's description of lesbian attitudes, then, reveals the various, complex, ambiguous charac ter of lesbian situations. 9 Despite the conclusion drawn by Card, which claims that Beauvoir sees all lesbians as rejecting heterosexual logic in their attitudes, or Ferguson's conclusions about Beauvoir's naturalism, through a description of lesbian attitudes, Beauvoir asserts, "it is all the more useless to try and place lesbians in two definitive categories…. Looking more closely, one can ascertain...that their sexuality is ambiguous" (Beauvoir 2010, 431) . Thus, following Heinamaa and Merleau-Ponty, my reading of "The Lesbian" suggests that Beauvoir uses the notion of lesbian attitude to convey modes of relating to the world, which allows one to understand the situation of the lesbian in a concretized, historical, social, authentic situation, not merely as a pathological, and therefore, inauthentic situation. In taking up such a reading, not only can we refute Card and Ferguson's critiques, but in understanding what Beauvoir specifically means when she writes of lesbian attitudes, we can also see the liberatory pulses of this notion. And, in taking the lived body as the basis for meaning, motivation, and choice we can understand lesbianism as subjectivity. Such an understanding is significant because, as Heinamaa notes, "When we apprehend a human body in such a personalistic way, we see it as wholly expressive" (Heinamaa 2006, 33) .
There are numerous lesbians among women artists and writers. It is not because their
The perception of lesbian experience as wholly expressive does not, however, merely refute the pathological discourse of psychoanalysis. Rather, understanding lesbian experience via the living body is to draw our attention to how sexuality is a process of becoming within one's situation. Notably, however, Beauvoir's account of lesbian experience suggests the ways in which lesbian experience can and do differ from women's experience of heterosexuality. Unlike the sexual initiation thrust upon women in heterosexuality, understanding lesbian attitudes dis- 9 Altman asserts a similar point in regards to Beauvoir's use of psychoanalytic and sexological discourse to describe the lives of lesbians. For Altman, "One may see the proliferation of strange stories as ultimately pathologizing and sensationalizing the whole topic, or one may see them as cumulatively unhooking gender identity from sexual ‚preference' and sexual behavior: if so many different things are possible, how could we say that any single simple connection was necessary? No one factor can explain why some women are lesbians, but some are. Recognizing this is one more way Beauvoir breaks the link between sexuality and procreation." (Altman 2007, 217) close different manifestations of female sexuality. However, Beauvoir does not attribute a fundamental radicality to lesbian experience. 10 Rather, the novelty of her description lies in her poignant remarks about the particularities and specificities of lesbian experience, which, for Beauvoir, are undoubtedly manifold and existential. Thus, for Beauvoir, lesbian experience, "Like all human behavior" involves "playacting, imbalance, failure, or lies, or, on the other hand, it will be the source of fruitful experiences, depending on whether it is lived in bad faith, laziness, and inauthenticity or in lucidity, generosity and freedom" (Beauvoir 2010, 436) . Lesbian experience, then, is not a flight from heterosexuality and Beauvoir's insight is not analogous to a radicalesbian position. Rather, "The Lesbian" illustrates the ways in which lesbian experiences are lived, like other, albeit different situations, as complex, ambiguous and embodied situations, which makes a critical difference in how we are to understand how Beauvoir thinks lesbian experience. 11
Beauvoirian Lesbianism
What, then, do we gain from Beauvoir's notion of lesbianism? And what can we do with it? I see several advantages of Beauvoir's account, though I am sure the advantages are manifold. First, it allows us to think through lesbianism as more than sex. That is, from Beauvoir's account, we see that lesbian life is not first and foremost about sex. We are not drawn into equating "lesbian" with sexuality, thus avoiding heteronormative ideology that tries to keep sexuality behind closed doors or that maintains that it is not a public matter. At the same time, however, her account is not void of sex, even though, "The Lesbian" makes little to no reference to sexual pleasure. 12 Rather, we can see this omission as a means to make us think more about what it means to live a lesbian life, and not just what it means to have lesbian sex. That is, Beauvoir anticipates much queer theory that asks us to queer-y the social world and think about how lesbians come to experience their lives, bodies, and worlds in very particular, lesbian ways. Lesbian life is not just about what goes on in the bedroom, but is about a concrete social, historical, and political situation.
Secondly, Beauvoir provides a political framework from which we can grapple with the ways in which lesbians are differentially positioned within society not from the basis of identity, but from a phenomenological perspective that pays acute attention to how lesbians live in the world. From this perspective, identity claims are seen as reductive attempts to categorize lesbian life and form an insular lesbian political community. Instead, a phenomenological politics of lesbian existence demands we pay acute attention to the various ways in which lesbian lives are not only positioned differentially in society, but also how they are lived differentially within a given society or given societies. As such, Beauvoir's phenomenological politics also allows us to account for the ways in which normative forces make claims on lesbian lives. Ultimately, then, in addition to gaining insight from her own account, what we can do with Beauvoir's account is utilize her methodology to understand how lesbian existence is experienced today. And in doing so, we gain a notion of lesbianism that is complex, but nonetheless concrete, situated, and void of the sweeping universals that make some lives fall into the closet and out of sight.
So, it turns out that Beauvoir's "The Lesbian" offers a significant and critical account of lesbian existence. What we gain from Beauvoir is both a rich descriptive account of lesbian life at the time Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex and nuanced philosophical insights about the ambiguities, complexities, differences, and similarities amongst lesbians themselves and amongst those that are lesbian and those who are not. It provides Ferguson with a historicized notion of lesbianism that is also socio-political and it offers Card a phenomenological account of lesbian existence that is contingent and both human and utterly lesbian. And, perhaps even more importantly, it provides us with both a motivation and means to complicate, challenge, and refine what we perceive lesbian existence to be right here and now.
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